

SECRET KAPOK

414

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

CR 435
2155

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

ATTACHMENTS 2 to

FROM:

NO.

NAFO

SE/EX-mad

DATE

1952

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. SE/EX		OCT 1 1952	OCT 1 1952	hw	
2. SEKPP		1 OCT 1952			
3. SE/I			6/05	Shm	
4. []			8 Oct	Shm	
5. []			27 Oct	W	
6. AB			3 Nov	AB	
7. []					
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KAPOK

BY HAND ONLY

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the 3 identities for R1
indexing

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. _____

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

KAPOK - 886

TO : Chief, SE
Attn: ☐
FROM : Chief ☐

DATE: 10 September 1952

SUBJECT: GENERAL— BGFIEND

SPECIFIC— LCFLAKE Suspicions of ZBCROWN-TPROACH-KMSTRIDE Cooperation

REFERENCE: ☐ 267, DIR 17860

1. As reported in paragraph 3 of first reference, we are forwarding under separate cover a memorandum of conversation on subject. The following comments are made for clarification and your information.

2. Identity (1) met one of the political officers of the Embassy in the LCFLAKE Foreign Ministry and expressed a desire to discuss some KMWAAHOO matters. The political officer notified Identity (2) who went to the Foreign Ministry and had the reported conversation.

3. The LCFLAKES seem to have substantial evidence that two members of QKFERVOR did visit the KMWAAHOO-TPROACH border. In connection with this allegation two possibilities have come to mind. ☐ was away what seemed to be an unduly long time mounting his last mission, however, we were notified that one member of the team was taken ill and had to be replaced. Also of interest is the reappearance of Identity (3) on the streets of LCDRINK following a trip through TPROACH.

4. Identity (2) will see Identity (1) later this week to clarify the HTCURIO position. Any further developments or information will be reported.

5. In connection with second reference, please note paragraph A. of second attachment.

Attachments: (s.c.)

1. Identities
2. Memorandum of Conversation

Distribution:

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Attachment 1 to 5

~~KAPOK~~ 886

Identity (1) - Basile Mostras

Identity (2) - Peter Lamas

Identity (3) - Richard Brooman-White

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Attachment 2 to ()

309059 9 September 1952 ~~KAPOK~~

MEMORANDUM TO: ()

FROM: ()

SUBJECT: Conversation of 8 September with Mr. Lamas

1. As per our conversation, following is a summary of my conversation with Peter Lamas:

2. On Friday, September 5, Mr. Lamas was asked by the Greek Foreign Ministry to see Mr. Mostras, Chief of the Albanian Affairs Section. Following are the issues which Mr. Mostras discussed with Mr. Lamas:

a. To open the conversation, Mr. Mostras offered the information that there had been much talk of a revolt in Albania but the only evidence he had was of a small gun battle in which 25 persons had been killed. When asked where and when this incident took place he said he did not have that information.

b. Mr. Mostras asked Mr. Lamas if he knew what the British policy toward the Yugo sponsored Prizren Committee was. Mr. Lamas replied that he did not know. Mr. Mostras went on to say that the Greek Government had very conclusive information that the British were supporting the Prizren Committee. When asked for his source of this information he did not elaborate but did mention he was aware that two Britishers, whom the Greeks consider to be members of the British Intelligence Service, had recently visited the Yugo-Albanian border and the Greek Government views this with suspicion.

c. When Mr. Mostras finished the discussion of British policy he asked what exactly was the U.S. policy toward Albania and which liberation group did the U.S. sponsor? Mr. Lamas answered that the U.S. favored the Committee for Free Albania. Then Mr. Mostras asked if the U.S. approved of the Italian sponsored liberation committee. Mr. Lamas again said (as he did not know anything about this committee) that the U.S. favored the Committee for Free Albania.

d. Mr. Mostras hinted that our Embassy in Belgrade could bring pressure to bear on the Yugos which would curb the activities of the Prizren Committee.

e. Mr. Mostras summarized his conversation and added that Greece would not sit idly by and watch Albania become a province of Yugoslavia whether during a general war or by a so called internal revolt. He also said that Greece could not afford to have this part of her border transferred from one type of Communist border to another.

3. At this meeting Mr. Lamas took the opportunity of asking if the Albanian question had been discussed with the recent Yugoslav Friendship Mission, the answer was absolutely not. Then Mr. Lamas asked if it would be brought up with the Military Group, Mr. Mostras said he felt certain it would not. At this juncture in the conversation Mr. Mostras did say the question might be presented to NATO by the Greeks.

4. Mr. Lamas asked me if we could brief him on some of these points and also if there were any questions we would like brought up at his next meeting with Mostras.

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